2009年7月28日 星期二

日本手機演化論

Why Japan’s Cellphones Haven’t Gone Global
Published: July 19, 2009

TOKYO — At first glance, Japanese cellphones are a gadget lover’s dream: ready for Internet and e-mail, they double as credit cards, boarding passes and even body-fat calculators.

(New York Times 全文在此)

Comment:

Japan’s cellphones –
an endemic species fantastically evolved and divergent from the world outside.


No one would doubt that Japan is one of the most innovative countries in the world. A product made in Japan, usually stands for high quality and advanced technology. Meanwhile, Japanese have also brought the world many interesting products such as Nintendo's Wii. The Japanese seems to have strong obsession with mechanical technology for some unexplainable reason. We can tell this from their craze for robots and all those clever devices, like cell phones.

Why do Japan’s multifunctional cellphones have little presence beyond its shores? Japanese describe this situation as a Galapagos syndrome.

Japan's cellphone was years ahead of the world, so they set a standard for the second-generation network first through which people can access a fenced-in Web via their cellphone. This mobile Web quickly became a huge success that fostered huge e-commerce and contain market within Japan and changed the way Japanese use their cellphone from that time. However, the rest of the world did not adapt Japan’s standard for the second-generation. Instead, they developed a new standard which made the Japan's system isolated from the global market. The situation of Japan is like the species in Galapagos island in that both of them evolved in their own way isolated from the outside world.

Cellphones in Japan were well developed and Japanese makers added their wildest imaginations of what cellphones can do onto the little handsets which make up the cellphones on the market today. For examples, cellphone today are equipped with the function of 3G, camera, music downloading, and even electronic payment following the lead of the Japanese.

Everything was so perfect until a global financial crisis woke them up. The Japanese makers realized the fully developed domestic market is not big enough to support their growth and the global market is so difficult to prise open. They also contribute to their own problems by an overwhelmingly emphasis on hardware function rather than software. Therefore, Japan's cellphones can not synchronize data with PCs as the iPhone and other smart phones do.

I find it interesting that in Darwin's original concept evolution dose not develop toward a specific direction but depend on the specific environment. The Japanese give life to their cellphones in their own way and formed their own culture which is why neither the iPhone and other smart phones outside Japan can easily get in, nor the Japan's get out. In other words, there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the fact that Japan develops cellphone in one way while the world do it in another way.

However, following the growth and interdependency of the global market and everchanging financial environment, Japan's cellphone makers can not stick only to domestic market anymore. I think a smart way to improve the situation is to take from the long to add to the short, which is combining their advanced mechanical technology with software integration. It is time for another evolution.

2009年7月23日 星期四

[剪報]美調整東盟政策 遏制中國影響力

2009年07月21日 格林尼治標準時間20:40北京時間 04:40發表

美國國務卿希拉里21日抵達泰國,出席即將召開的東南亞國家聯盟(簡稱東盟)地區論壇,這是美國國務卿多年來首次出席東盟系列會議。

希拉里此行還將與東盟簽署《東南亞友好合作條約》,這預示美國總統奧巴馬一改前任布什政府忽視東盟的政策,傳遞出對這一地區安全和經濟事務施加影響的強烈信號。

美國克萊蒙﹒麥肯納學院政治系教授、中美問題專家裴敏欣對BBC中文網說:

“奧巴馬當政后有一個十分明顯的政治轉變,重新利用美國的影響力和軟實力,重塑美國在世界各地的形象。”

裴敏欣認為,東盟成為奧巴馬政府重塑美國權威與影響力的一個試點。

《東南亞友好合作條約》誕生于1976年東盟首腦會議,是東盟的重要文件之一。其內容涵蓋簽署國承諾相互尊重主權、不干涉內政等。

除了東盟十個成員國外,中國、俄羅斯、日本、韓國等國也是該條約簽字國。美國一直沒有簽署,擔心不能對該地區的諸如緬甸、柬埔寨等國進行施壓和干預。

裴敏欣認為,希拉里此行將簽署這一條約預示美國有意更深地介入東盟事務,同時遏制中國在這一地區日益擴張的影響力。

此前日本媒體報道,美國欲強化與東盟關系,提出開發湄公河流域,但排除中國,此計划得到日本的贊同。

裴敏欣說:“美國確實有遏制中國、擴大美國自己的影響力的考慮。不過,美國會在具體方式上比較巧妙一些,并不想在不十分重要的問題上與中國發生正面沖突。”

預計,希拉里此次參加東盟地區論壇的主要議題是呼吁各國對朝鮮施壓,迫使其回到六方會談的談判桌前,尤其是停止與緬甸之間可能進行的軍火交易。

裴敏欣說,中美在促使朝鮮重返談判問題上立場一致,這會對兩國在對東盟的爭奪中起到平衡牽制的作用。


---------------------------------------------------
東南亞友好合作條約


新華網

《東南亞友好合作條約》是東南亞國家聯盟(東盟)成 員國于1976年2月24日在印度尼西亞巴厘島舉行的東盟第一次首腦會議上簽署的。條約的宗旨是“促進地區各國人民之間永久和平、友好和合作,以加強他們 的實力、團結和密切關係”。條約規定,締約各方在處理相互間關係時應遵循以下基本原則,即相互尊重獨立、主權、平等、領土完整和各國的民族特性;任何國家 都有免受外來幹涉、顛覆和制裁,保持其民族生存的權利;互不幹涉內政;和平解決分歧或爭端;反對訴諸武力或以武力相威脅;締約各國間進行有效合作。迄今東 南亞10國已全部加入這個條約。

1987年12月15日,《第一修改議定書》在原《條約》基礎上增加兩款,分 別作為《條約》的第18條第三款和第十四條第二款,內容分別為:“東南亞以外的國家,經過東南亞所有締約國及文萊達魯薩蘭國的同意,也可加入”該條約和“ 但是,加入本條約的東南亞以外任何國家只有直接涉及以及需要通過上述地區程序解決的爭端時,才適用”第十四條第一款。

1998年7月25日,東盟外長在馬尼拉簽署了《條約》的《第二修改議定 書》,內容為:將《條約》第十八條第三款中“東南亞以外的國家,經過東南亞所有締約國及文萊達魯薩蘭國的同意,也可加入”修改為“經東南亞所有國家,即文 萊達魯薩蘭國、柬埔寨王國、印度尼西亞共和國、老撾人民民主共和國、馬來西亞、緬甸聯邦、菲律賓共和國、新加坡共和國、泰王國和越南社會主義共和國的同 意,東南亞以外的國家也可加入”該條約。從而使非東南亞地區的國家也可加入《東南亞友好合作條約》

除了東盟成員國外,加入該條約的還有中國、印度、日本、韓國、巴基斯坦、俄羅斯、新西蘭、澳大利亞、法國、東帝汶、斯裏蘭卡、孟加拉國、朝鮮、美國。截至2009年7月,東盟外加入該條約的國家達到16個 。2003年10月,中國在印尼巴厘島舉行的第7次東盟與中國(10+1)領導人會議上正式加入《東南亞友好合作條約》。 2009年7月,美國國務卿希拉裏·克林頓與東盟國家外長簽署美國加入《東南亞友好合作條約》 的文件。

2009年7月22日 星期三

[剪報] ECFA

為何要急簽ECFA 政府說清楚了嗎?

  • 2009-07-19
  • 工商時報
  • 【本報訊】

 在東協十加一即將簽署的當下,台灣正面臨著貿易被邊緣化的可能,因此加速推動與大陸簽署ECFA,是箭在弦上的政策。儘管政府不斷告訴民眾這個急迫性,卻沒有講清楚,ECFA要多少年後才會有效果?簽署了ECFA之後,兩岸關係會走向何方?有了ECFA之後,美國、日本等國家是否就能與我方簽署FTA?

 2002年中國大陸與東南亞國家國協簽署了「中國─東盟(協)全面經濟合作框架協議」,決定在2010年正式成立中國─東協自由貿易區(CFTA),也就是現在俗稱的「東協十加一」。

 東協十加一擁有17億的人口,經濟規 模達到2兆美元、貿易總額超過2,300億美元,2010年成立自由貿易區後,可望將區域內貿易額拉高至1.2兆美元。而包含日本、韓國在內的「東協十加 三」,也要在2015年組成自由貿易區,將成為世界上人口最多的自由貿易區,擁有人口20億,經濟規模達到7兆美元,僅次於北美自由貿易區。

 緊鄰在這個龐大的自由貿易區旁邊,但卻無法享有關稅優惠政策,將成為未來台灣經濟發展的致命傷,這點無論是政府還是學界,過去1年來已經重申了無數次了。可是,社會上因不了解而反對的民眾仍所在多有,最主要的原因就是民眾無法想像簽署ECFA後的世界

 東協十加一是經過了多年的談判,並且有長達8年的磨合期,才能進入明年將實施的大部分往來商品低關稅,甚至是免稅的境界。既然政府過去1 年來不斷強調必須速簽ECFA,來降低東協十加一的衝擊,但是卻沒有告訴大家,這個ECFA要多久後才能付諸實施,兩岸又有什麼辦法可以加快度過磨合期

 另外,相關政府官員不斷強調,正因中國大陸從中作梗,造成美國、日本、新加坡等國家不願與台灣簽署FTA,所以要先跟大陸達成某程度共識,才能促使其他國家來與我們成立FTA。難道ECFA簽署後,就能毫無阻力與主要貿易大國完成FTA?

 甚至,在簽署ECFA的程序上,台灣就與大陸的認知有一段距離,在初步溝通階段就有落差,未來真正執行時,是否也會有誤判出現?

 舉例來說,中國大陸政府官員過去在提到兩岸洽簽ECFA時,都相當肯定的說,下半年「談起來」,但是我方卻一廂情願的認為下半年就「簽得成」,導致今年內確定無法簽署ECFA後,引起了輿論界極大的撻伐聲浪。

 而原本要在第三次「江陳會談」後2個月內簽署的MOU,也因中國大陸方面希望把市場的准入部分一起談,和原先我方政府先簽MOU後再談市場准入方向相異,而造成現在MOU簽不下來,市場准入問題也沒有共識的窘境。


被過度簡化的ECFA

【經濟日報╱社論】2009.07.20

經 濟部長尹啟銘昨天啟程前往新加坡,出席亞太經濟合作會議(APEC)貿易部長會議,但更受關注的行程,是他與中國大陸商務部長陳德銘的「雙銘會」,會否對 兩岸經濟合作架構協議(ECFA)達成特定共識或進度。這是上周台股因ECFA可能延簽而暴跌後,經長再一次給予市場的希望,卻也凸顯政府過度簡化 ECFA的問題。

兩岸洽簽經合協定,是去年4月底馬英九總統上任前,在拜會三三會時提出的。經過一番爭論,這項意在突破兩岸既無法是「國與國關係」、也不能淪為「中港模 式」的第三條路,在今年2月定名為「兩岸經濟合作架構協議」,並以英文名稱縮寫為ECFA,經濟部還以「產品出口免關稅,市場訂單坐直達,投資設廠留台 灣,頭家伙計雙雙發」的四句聯,形容這項協議簽訂後對兩岸的效益。

不過,經濟部只一廂情願地提出ECFA的好處,ECFA的形式為何、如何協商又如何簽署、涵括那些產業項目等,政府官員目前的回應都是在打迷糊仗,僅在進 度時程有無落後上打轉;甚至,還有些官員為了爭功及凸顯主導權,在尚未正式協商前即誇口兩岸已有共識,並點明比照大陸與東協的自由貿易協定(FTA)架 構,要求彼岸「多給一點」,我方則可以「多拿少給」。凡此種種,都過度美化ECFA的效益,也過度簡化ECFA的複雜,如此無助於政策的推動。

經貿協商是經濟、政治利益折衝的過程,政府自難暢所欲言,但不代表可以豁免向社會解說政策的義務。ECFA是對台灣經濟影響深遠的重大政策,從兩岸經貿關 係正常化、區域經濟突圍、擴大台灣經貿舞台而言,我們原則支持與彼岸洽簽這項架構協議的必要性;但也疾聲呼籲政府,務實回應社會對ECFA的關注及期待, 用民眾聽得懂的話、說民眾應該知道的事,並做能履行的政策承諾。

這些民眾應該知道的事,至少可包括:兩岸洽簽的ECFA,究竟是一步到位的全面自由化,還是先簽框架性協議架構、分次推展的階段性自由化?從經貿實務及國際經驗而言,分段到位較符合我方利益,也可避免因此過度依賴大陸,尤其我方洽簽主權等級程度低於FTA的ECFA,除了降低東協與大陸FTA明年實現的經 濟衝擊外,更長遠的目標是在突破兩岸特殊關係對台灣與他國洽簽FTA的障礙;而分段可給予我方測試彼岸態度的機會,如果未獲善意也可及時踩煞車,亦可以此 化解社會對台灣是否向大陸傾斜的疑慮。然而,政府卻連這一點也不說清楚。

再者,ECFA的洽簽範圍,是限於關稅減讓的商品貿易產業,還是要擴大到金融等服務投資市場的准入?這部分,政府也是含糊不清。如依東協與大陸FTA的經 濟衝擊時效性而言,政府理應是將商品貿易當做主攻項目,再將金融服務相互准入、投資保障協定、商品檢驗相互承認協定等較複雜的項目納入後續協商議程;如此 不只可加速ECFA的洽簽時程,也可讓金融監理備忘錄(MOU)與ECFA脫鉤。不過,或因內部各方要求放入ECFA的壓力擺不平,也或因經濟部的研究評 估報告要到9、10月才出來,以致我方的談判策略拿不定主意,這或許才是ECFA總是處於非正式協商階段的主因。

另一個有待釐清的是,大陸一直有意以福建為主的海峽西岸經濟區做為ECFA的試點,我方態度模稜兩可,但已有一股力量在隱隱推動。ECFA是否應僅限於台灣與海西區的試點有討論空間,但政府應以更開放的態度與各界溝通。


社論-ECFA的下一步是向左走或向右走?

  • 2009-07-22
  • 工商時報
  • 【本報訊】

 醞釀許久的「兩岸經濟合 作架構協議」(ECFA)簽訂之事,近日終於有了眉目。因雙方高層已相互確認「下半年談起來」,且我方相關主管單位亦完成了初步內容,同時兩岸對ECFA 正式協商的時程,也有了默契,預計將在今年9月或10月啟動。跡象顯示,兩岸雙方對此事,都已「抓緊」了步驟,使雙方之正式簽訂「有期可待」,至遲在明年 某時可以實現。

 目前各方最關心的是,ECFA未來協商定案的內容究竟為何?對此,經濟部尹啟銘部長已提出「一顆三黃蛋」的講法,表明ECFA這個「蛋」,裡面將有三顆蛋黃,分別是貨品貿易自由化(免關稅)、服務業貿易自由化(焦點在銀行設點營業)、投資自由化(投資准入加投資保障)。可是,尹部長沒講明,這顆蛋將來孵出來的,是一隻什麼品種的禽鳥,它將來又會長成何種模樣。

 我們提出這問題,是要弄清楚ECFA的「血統」。因它事關ECFA在兩岸座標中的定位,以及它未來的 蛻變模式和過渡方向。其實這問題也不怎麼複雜,關鍵只在於, ECFA究係比較像陸港CEPA(更緊密經貿關係安排),或比較類似普世常見的FTA(自由貿易協定)。雖然,我政府一再宣稱,ECFA為因應當前兩岸的 特殊關係,它既不是CEPA,也非FTA,而是介於兩者之間。但我們從實務面看出,CEPA和FTA存在本質上的差異,兩者不能簡單平均,所以ECFA也 很難不偏不倚地,擺在正中90度線上,它總會往左偏或往右靠。

 從目前兩岸經濟實力的對比落差來看,台灣有求於大陸的,相對較多,而大陸有求於台灣的,則顯著較少。此種客觀形勢,幾乎已決定了,ECFA會比較像CEPA,也就是大陸對台灣照顧的較多,而台灣對大陸優惠的較少,有些像當前大陸和香港的關係。當然,這種關係,大異於雙方充分平等互惠的FTA。

 在這種格局下,將來兩岸雙方簽訂的ECFA,將形成一種「不對稱」的兩岸經貿關係。如關稅相互減免,會挑選對台灣有利的項目(石化、機械 等)產品,率先實施,至於對台灣不利者,則少做或押後再議。其次,大陸對台灣農產品照單全收,卻對台灣禁止大陸農產品進口政策,繼續容忍。還有,大陸對台 灣金融機構登陸設點營業,大幅降低門檻,但卻允許台灣,對陸資金融機構登台設點營業,採取較多的限制。類似的「傾斜」安排,可預期將貫穿各部門、各產業。

 值得注意的是,現階段大陸之所以願意特別照顧台灣,主要目的,是為了促進兩岸關係「和平發展」,未來更進一步的目標,則是達成兩岸政經的充分整合。這是普世所共知的事實。對此,我們不想去牽扯泛政治化的「統獨之爭」,只是要提出一個重要的概念,那就是兩岸關係會往前「發展」,而且ECFA也會進一步「演變」,不會長久保持初期的樣態。對此,我政府應有妥適對策。

 說得更具體一點,如果ECFA實行一段期間後,兩岸「和平發展」的進度,符合大陸當局的規劃與預期,則大陸方面,很可能將更多經濟優惠授 予台灣,使ECFA更進一步向CEPA傾斜、靠攏。反之,若兩岸和平發展進度不符大陸之期待,甚至逆反大陸原先之規劃,則大陸當局勢必收緊對台的特殊優 惠,並轉而要求台灣,按「平等互惠」原則辦事,也同樣給大陸產品、企業一樣的優惠。屆時,ECFA會發生質變,反向朝FTA傾斜。在這種情況下,台灣市場將被迫對大陸全面開放,整體經濟一定會遭受沉重壓力。

 ECFA將來究竟向左走或向右走?這問題掛鉤著兩岸關係走向,兩者必然密切連動。對此,我政府應提前未雨綢繆,至少不能老是認 為,ECFA只論經濟,和政治無涉。這種觀念,事實上只是短期有效,中長期即未必如此。我政府對ECFA,一定要儘快做好全盤的政經綜合考量,不能以短線 操作為足。大陸國台辦主任王毅6月時說,兩岸關係發展,不存在只談經濟不談政治的問題。這是一個重要的信號,應予正視。



2009年7月20日 星期一

Economist - Is China fraying?

Racial killings and heavy-handed policing stir up a repressed and dangerous province

IT BEGAN as a protest about a brawl at the other end of the country; it became China’s bloodiest incident of civil unrest since the massacre that ended the Tiananmen Square protests 20 years ago. The ethnic Uighurs in the far western city of Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang province, accused Han Chinese factory workers in the southern province of Guangdong of racial violence against Uighur co-workers. By the time Urumqi’s Uighurs had finished venting their anger, more than 150 people were dead and hundreds more injured.

(詳全文)


COMMENTS:

Under the constrain of one China


After the Tibet unrest in 2008, rioting in Xinjiang snore out in June 2009. The Beijing government has been busy handling these events. Learning from previous experiences, Beijing government has been increasingly able to manipulate the international media in order to control opinion toward China. However, the fundamental cause of these events is the Beijing government’s paranoid concept of one China.

It is important to notice that China was never a one nation state. It includes several ethnic groups including Han Chinese, Tibetan, Mongolian, Uighur, etc. On the surface, China gives Tibetans and Uighurs the right of self-rule. In fact, the unequal socioeconomic state between Han Chinese and these minorities usually gives Han Chinese a dominant position. Ignoring their differences and strongly holding them together are what China is trying to do.

There are two main reasons explain why China strongly opposes to the independence of Xinjing and Tibet. First, although both Tibet and Xinjiang are composed mainly of mountains and deserts, they account for 40% of China’s territory. This is not to mention their enormous strategic importance on the border of South and Central Asia.

Secondly, to stop Xinjing and Tibet from going independence implies the Beijing government’s similar attitude toward Taiwan, since the Beijing government considers Taiwan as a part of China. Maintaining a total consistency in One China policy fits well with China’s best interests.

Following the growth of its economy, China has gained an increasingly important role in the world. Even the US has a lot of issues that they need to work with China. Therefore, when China describes the Xinjiang unrest as an outside threat and connects its internal problems with a global agenda like anti-terrorism, they can claim legitimacy is cracked down on disorder.

2009年7月16日 星期四

Comment: 宏都拉斯作錯了什麼?

What did Honduras do wrong when they kicked off an obviously lousy President?

In an age of economic crisisies and political unrest, people in Latin America may expect there will be some one to stand up and guide them. However, an over-mighty president, on the other hand, may remind them of the political nightmare before they started to practice democracy decades ago.

In the small, mainly poor and unstable countries of central America, Honduras is considered relatively stable. In other words, you can imagine when president Mr Manuel Zelaya was kicked out of his country on June 28th, how surprised the world was.

The political crisis of Honduras occurred mainly because the incumbent president Manuel Zelaya want to emulate Mr Chavez by organizing a referendum to call for a constitution assembly which may allow him to remain in power regardless the opposition in Congress and the courts. That is why the military arrested him for defying the Supreme Court and bundled him off to a neighbouring country. The legislature then voted unanimously to install Mr Micheletti as his successor.

The only people who do not think the action was not a coup are Hondurans themselves,while their neighbors and rest of the world think otherwise. Though Mr Zelaya made a the first mistake, the Honduras Congress soon followed. The Honduras constitution contains no provision for impeachment. Instead of brining him before the judges, they drove the President away under military force. Therefore, no countries in Americas has recognized Mr Micheletti’s regime but asked for the restoration of Mr Zelaya. In short, Hondurans attempted to correct the initial mistake, but chose the wrong method.

Under the pressure from international society, the dispute might be solved in a predictable way.

From this crisis we have learned that the democratization is a long process. It takes time to move from one phase to another. First, we become aware that something is wrong. Then we should know how to correct it in a legitimate way. In the end, we may grasp the essence of democracy which is that no one can prevent a legitimate exchange of power in a democratic society.

2009年7月10日 星期五

Economist - Lousy president, terrible precedent

摘要

不穩定的政治,是拉丁美洲長久以來揮之不去的夢魘。但自從拉美國家實施民主政治以來,過去這20年已經少見此種事件發生。除了2002年,委內瑞拉總統查唯茲透過召開憲政會議使自己得以無限期連任總統後,曾短暫的引起反對的騷動。

宏都拉斯的總統Zelaya,試圖模仿查唯茲的模式,透過公投召開憲政會議獲得獨裁的權力。但此舉遭到宏國國會與最高法院的反對,於是,發動政變將總統趕出國。此舉動在法理上站不住腳,因為宏國並沒有透過憲政程序發動彈劾,反而運用軍方力量將他驅逐出境,在拉美民主進程中立下了一個不好的先例。也因此受到國際的譴責,紛紛要求宏都拉斯讓Zelaya復職。

事實上,Zelaya在國內支持度很低,他也不太可能秤心如意的透過改變憲政體制。這件事情的發生,不經意的透露出拉美區域,對於委內瑞拉總統查唯茲建立政權的方式在拉美造成的政治氣氛。當年拉美民眾覺得受夠了偏右的政治取向,才紛紛開始左傾。或許現在會因為同樣的理由而厭倦起這些偏左的份子。

政變後的宏都拉斯發現自己孤立無援,鄰近拉美國家以及美國都不支持這樣的舉動。伴隨而來的經濟制裁等手段,也許有機會讓賽拉亞有條件的復職。解決這場紛爭事小,困難的是如何防止拉丁美洲這些權力過大的總統侵害他們的民主政治。

(全文如下)

Lousy president, terrible precedent

Jul 2nd 2009
From The Economist print edition

Manuel Zelaya should be restored to power. He should also be forced to respect the constitution

IT WAS a flashback to a nightmare that Latin Americans hoped they had awoken from for good. Heavily armed soldiers burst into the presidential residence in Tegucigalpa, the capital of Honduras, in the early hours, arrested the pyjama-clad president, Manuel Zelaya, and bundled him off to neighbouring Costa Rica. Once all too familiar, such events have become rare in Latin America over the past two decades as democracy has put down roots. It was the first coup in the region since the confused ousting of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti in 2003, and a brief rising against Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez in 2002.

In Honduras the soldiers acted with the support of the courts and the legislature, whose head, Roberto Micheletti, was sworn in as president to serve out the remainder of Mr Zelaya’s term until January next year (see page 43). Even so, as Barack Obama rightly said, the ousting of Mr Zelaya was “illegal” and set “a terrible precedent”. It was universally and emphatically condemned in Latin America. It is vital for democracy in the region that it should be reversed.

But to stop there is to miss some of what is at stake. Mr Zelaya, a businessman, alienated his own party and his country’s political establishment by his decision last year to forge an alliance with Mr Chávez, joining the Venezuelan’s anti-American block. In return, he got aid and political advice. Mr Zelaya felt emboldened to organise a referendum on convening a constituent assembly—the very device Mr Chávez used to establish an autocracy. Since such an exercise violated the constitution and both Congress and the courts were firmly opposed to it, this unleashed a conflict of powers.

Oddly, the Honduran constitution contains no provision for impeachment. Even so, kicking Mr Zelaya out was wholly the wrong way to try to resolve the dispute. It was stupid, too: Mr Zelaya was fairly unpopular and unlikely to get his way. That it happened regardless shows the deep fear of Mr Chávez among political establishments across Latin America. He is a particular ogre in the small, mainly poor and unstable countries of Central America, which are also beset by drug traffickers. Venezuela’s boss is mistrusted both for his meddling and for the example he has set of coming to power democratically and then stacking the rules in his favour. One of his allies, Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua, next-door to Honduras, stole a municipal election last November, for instance.
For change, stick to the electoral road

Yet fear is turning to paranoia. If many left-of-centre governments, of varying political hues, have come to power in Latin America it is because voters became fed up with their right-of-centre predecessors. Some are now starting to tire of leftist and populist incumbents too. This week Argentines served notice on the Kirchner family that their dominance is over (see article). Would-be election riggers in the region will find it hard to prevent the alternation that is the essence of democracy.

Honduras’s new government finds itself friendless beyond its borders. Restoring Mr Zelaya to office should not be impossible. It will require economic pressure but also some kind of deal with Mr Micheletti’s regime, perhaps involving an early election. Honduras’s neighbours should help in this respect, as should the United States, which has considerable influence in Honduras and a strong interest in a stable, democratic Central America. By his forthright condemnation of the coup Mr Obama has ensured that he will not be outflanked by Mr Chávez over Honduras. The more difficult question for Latin America is how to prevent over-mighty presidents from undermining their own democratic institutions. Once that practice ceases, coups really will be a thing of the past.


延伸閱讀:
Ecomist: Defying the outside world
背景分析:洪都拉斯政變亂局往哪去?(新華網)

2009年7月2日 星期四

[轉錄]文化評論 / 美國:致畢業生


文化評論 / 美國:致畢業生
夏天,是說再見,也是新生的季節

自從1947年美國國務卿喬治˙馬歇爾(George C. Marshall)在哈佛大學畢業典禮上,宣導他的「馬歇爾經濟復興計劃」暢談如何重建二次大戰後的歐洲,產生極大的新聞效應之後,哈佛的畢業典禮致詞人 選從此就好比奧斯卡主持人,成為學術界的年度盛事之一。歷屆名單包括了諾貝爾文學得主索忍尼辛(Alexander Solzhenitsyn),微軟的蓋茲(Bill Gates),周六夜生活的喜劇演員法洛(Will Ferrell),創立魔法學校的羅琳(J.K. Rowling),新近接掌Tonight Show的柯南(Conan O’Brien),以及現任的美國能源部長朱棣文(Steven Chu)等等。

致詞人選如此廣徵博選,哈佛無疑是想給離校在即的學子們最後一針強心劑;但是,有多少人會把這十分鐘的演講奉為圭臬?



全文轉此